Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Pre-emption of Democracy by Scharpf, F.
___________________ ABHANDLUNGEN/ ANALYSES 
Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and 
the Pre-emption of Democracy 
by Fritz W. Scharpf 
This contribution presents an analysis of the political economy of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU), focusing on the current fiscal crises in several Member States and propos-
ing an evaluation of the different avenues of crisis management available to policymak-
ers. The EMU has become a systemic cause of macroeconomic destabilisation that Mem-
ber States find difficult to counteract with their remaining policy instruments. 
Furthermore, it has greatly increased the vulnerability of some Member States to the 
repercussions of external shocks, such as the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Efforts of EMU 
governments to "rescue the Euro" will do little to correct economic imbalances and 
vulnerabilities, but are likely to deepen economic problems and political alienation in 
both the rescued and the rescuing polities. This development may yet transform the pre-
sent economic crisis into a crisis of democratic legitimacy. 
Dieser Beitrag analysiert die gegenwilrtige Krise der Europllischen Wilhrungsunion 
(EWU) aus politiJkonomischer Sicht und untersucht eine Reihe von miJglichen Pjaden zur 
Krisenbewilltigung. Die EWU erwies sich in den vergangenen Jahren als Wurzel einer 
Reihe makroiJkonomischer Destabilisierungstendenzen. die die Mitgliedstaaten aufgrund 
der Enge des ihnen verbleibenden Handlungsspielraums vor schwerwiegende Herausjor-
derungen ste/len. Zudem nahm in manchen Mitgliedstaaten die Verwundbarkeit gegen-
Uber extemen Verwetfungen, wie etwa der Finam:Jcrise der Jahre 2007-2009, deutlich zu. 
SchliejJlich diiifte die ,.Rettung des Euro" die grundlegenden Ungleichgewichte kaum 
ausgleichen, wlihrend ,.Retter" wie .,Gerettete" akuten wirtschliftlichen Problemen und 
politischen Entjremdungsprozessen gegenUberstehen. Als Folge dieser Entwicklung IWnn-
te aus der gegenwlirtigen Wirtschaftskrise eine Krise demokratischer Legitimation er-
wachsen. 
I. Introduction 
In capitalist democracies, governments depend on the confidence of their voters. 
To maintain this confidence, however, they also depend on the performance of 
their real economies and, increasingly, on the confidence of financial markets. 
To meet these requirements at the same time is difficult even under the best of 
circumstances. At the end of the long period of post-war economic growth, how-
ever, theorists of normative political economy postulated the existence of a sys-
temic contradiction between the state's need to ensure democratic legitimacy by 
163 
ABHANDLUNGEN/ANALYSES 
responding to citizens' demands for public services and redistribution, and the 
functional requirements of ensuring the continuing profitability of a capitalist 
economy. Depending on their position on the left-right spectrum of normative 
orientations, these authors interpreted the expected clash as either a "legitimacy 
crisis" or as a "governability crisis" of democratic capitalism. 1 
In the following decades, however, neither of these expectations was confirmed. 
Instead, voters in capitalist democracies seemed to have realised that their well-
being depended as much on the performance of the capitalist economy as on the 
public goods, services and transfers provided by the democratic state. Govern-
ments were of course held politically accountable for the performance of the 
public sector and its balance of benefits and compulsory contributions. But they 
were held equally accountable for managing the capitalist economy and ensuring 
its continuing provision of jobs, incomes and consumer goods. In effect, the 
capitalist economy's performance rather than its transformation seems to have 
become a crucial argument of democratic legitimacy. 
This presupposes, however, that democratically accountable governments have 
the capacity to shape the course of their economies. But compared to the situa-
tion in the early 1970s, the progressive internationalisation of economic interac-
tions has greatly increased the difficulties of successful economic management 
At that time, liberalisation had been largely confined to product markets. Nation-
al economic policy needed to ensure international competitiveness under a bal-
ance-of-payments constraint- but it was free in the choice of production regimes 
and in the macroeconomic management of the domestic economy. With the 
increasing integration of capital markets, however, international capital flows 
became decoupled from transactions in product markets, and financial inter-
penetration made national economies vulnerable to crises originating elsewhere. 
At the same time, international and, even more so, European rules on product 
and capital market liberalisation imposed legal constraints that eliminated many 
policy options on which governments had previously relied to manage national 
economies. Compared to the period before the 1970s, successful economic man-
agement has therefore become much harder. 
I a., for example, 0/fo, C.: Strukturprobleme des kapitalistiscben Staates, Frankfurt aM., 1972; Haber-
mas, J.: Legitimalionsprobleme im Spltkapitalismus, Frankfurt a.M., 1973; Hennis, W./Gmf Kielmon-
segg. P.!Matl. U. (eds.): Regierberkeit: Studien zu ihrer Problematisienmg. Vol. 2, Stuttgart. 1978; 
Schlifer, A.: Krisenlhcorieo dcr Denlokrat:ie: Unregielbarkeit, Spil.tbpitalismu.s und Postdcmokratie, in: 
Der Moderne Staat 211 (2009), IS9-183; Klenk, T./NIIllmeier, F.: Politische Kriseotheorien und die Re-
naissauce von Konjunlctu.rprogram, in: Der Modeme Staat 3fl (2010). 27~294. 
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In the present essay I focus on the European Monetary Union (EMU), which has 
removed crucial instruments of macroeconomic management from the control of 
democratically accountable governments. Worse yet, the EMU has been the 
systemic cause destabilising macroeconomic imbalances that Member States find 
difficult or impossible to counteract with their remaining policy instruments. 
And even though the international financial crisis had its origins beyond Europe, 
the Monetary Union has greatly increased the vulnerability of some Member 
States to its repercussions. Its effects have undermined the economic and fiscal 
viability of some EMU Member States, and have frustrated political demands 
and expectations to an extent that may yet transform the economic crisis into a 
crisis of democratic legitimacy. Moreover, present efforts of EMU governments 
to ''rescue the Euro" will do little to correct economic imbalances and vulnerabil-
ities, but are likely to deepen economic problems and political alienation in both 
the rescued and the rescuing polities. 
The paper begins with a brief reflection on the problematic relationship between 
democratic legitimacy and macroeconomic management. followed by an equally 
brief restatement of the essential elements of Keynesian and Monetarist policy 
models and their specific political implications. I then try to show how existing 
national regimes have been transformed by the creation of the European Mone-
tary Union, and how the destabilising dynamics of the European monetary policy 
have left some EMU Member States dangerously vulnerable at the onset of the 
international financial crisis. In the concluding section, I examine the likely po-
litico-economic and political consequences of programs intended to rescue the 
euro and to reform the regime of the monetary union. 
11. Democratic Legitimacy and Macroeconomic Management. 
After the Great Depression of the 1930s and World War 11, governments in 
Western democracies had rejected .. socialist" programs of centralised economic 
planning but had nevertheless assumed political responsibility for preventing the 
return of similar economic catastrophes. This was to be achieved through ''mac-
roeconomic" policies that would allow the state to increase or reduce aggregate 
economic demand in order to dampen the ups and downs of economic cycles, to 
prevent the rise of unemployment or inflation, and to ensure steady economic 
growth. The belief that macroeconomic management could in fact realise these 
goals originated in the crisis of the 1930s. It was largely conf'umed in the 
"Keynesian" decades after the War, and it survived the "Monetarist" counter 
revolution of the 1980s at least in the sense that economic crises continued to be 
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seen as consequences of macroeconomic mismanagement. But the very possibil-
ity of effective control does then create an internal dilemma of democratic legit-
imacy- or, more precisely, a potential conflict between the input-oriented and 
the output-oriented dimensions of democratic legitimacy.2 
Governments are supposed to carry out the "will of the people" and they are also 
supposed to serve the "common good". In the input dimension, therefore, gover-
nors may be held accountable for policy choices that are in conflict with the 
politically salient preferences of their constituents, whereas in the output dimen-
sion, they may be sanctioned if outcomes that may be attributed to government 
policy are seen to violate the politically salient concerns of the governed? In 
both dimensions, what is initially at stake is political support for the government 
of the day. But if it appears that elections and changes of government cannot 
make a difference, the democratic legitimacy of the political regime itself may be 
undermined. 
With regard to macroeconomic management, the outcomes that potentially have 
very bigh political salience are rising mass unemployment and accelerating rates 
of inflation. Since these are not the direct object of policy choices, however, 
discussions of input legitimacy must focus on the policy instruments that may be 
employed to affect outcomes indirectly. In macroeconomic economic theory, 
these include choices in monetary policy, fiscal policy, incomes policy and ex-
change-rate policy - all of which are assumed to have a direct effect on aggre-
gate economic demand and hence on economic growth, inflation and employ-
ment. They differ greatly, however, in their political salience and, hence, in their 
potential relevance for input-oriented democratic legitimacy. 
2 Schorpf. F. W.: Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?, Oxford. 1999. chapter I. The distinc-
tioo between input- and output-oriellted dimensiOIIS of democratic legitimacy uses the vocabulary of po-
litical systems theory (cf. Eastcm, D.: A Sytems Analysis of Political life, New Y or1t. 1965), but bas its 
roots in a much older tradition of normative political theory that struggles with the basic tension of hav-
ing to treat governors, at the wne time, as agents and as tl'llskes of the people (cf. Scharpf. F. W.: Dem-
olaatietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung, Konstanz. 1970). 
3 Salience is a highly contingent and selective attribute of policy issues or outcome conditions that may 
affect the ourcome of electiOIIS or incite citi7ens to engage in political actioo. And whereas accountabil-
ity for policy choices can be clearly targeted at a panicular governmeot. accountability for outcomes 
implies a distinctioo between events and conditioos that are thought to be under tbe potential c::ootrol of 
"government", and others which are ascribed to an "act of god". In multi-level polities. moreover, it is 
often unclear which level of government is causally responsible for which outcomes. But since voters 
are not obliged to be fair, they wiU tend to hold those governmeots accountable over which they happen 
to have electoral control - which in Em-ope is true of national governmeots, ralher than European gov-
erning institutioos. 
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Under normal conditions, monetary policy has relatively low salience in the 
electoral arena. It is seen to involve highly technical decisions that are best left to 
specialists in central banks and other agencies with an expertise in analyzing and 
manipulating macroeconomic aggregates. Ultimately, of course, these aggregates 
will also affect individuals and firms, and they may have massive distributional 
consequences. But these are not immediately visible, and when they occur, they 
are not obviously related to specific policy choices. The same is true of policies 
affecting the exchange rate. Fiscal-policy, by contrast, while also aiming at the 
public-sector deficit as an aggregate variable, must be implemented through 
disaggregated taxing and spending decisions that have a direct impact on the 
incomes of individuals and firms. And the same would be true if governments 
should (as they tried to do in some countries in the 1970s) adopt incomes poli-
cies that impose direct wage controls. 
Unlike monetary policy, therefore, choices of fiscal and incomes policy are liable 
to become politicised. If they should violate the politically salient ex-ante prefer-
ences of constituencies, they may reduce the electoral support of governments 
and, in the extreme case, undermine input legitimacy regardless of their func-
tional necessity for achieving acceptable macroeconomic outcomes. In other 
words, macroeconomic management creates the possibility for a democratic 
dilemma: By attempting to maintain output legitimacy through functionally ef-
fective policy choices, governments may undermine their input legitimacy- and 
vice versa. In actual practice, however, the intensity of the dilemma depends not 
only on the type of economic challenges but also on the choice between the 
Keynesian or Monetarist models or paradigms of macroeconomic management. 
Keyneslan Problems and the Bundesbank's Monetarist Social Compact 
The Keynesian model assigns the leading function to fiscal policy. In a recession, 
it is supposed to expand aggregate demand through tax cuts and deficit-financed 
expenditures; and when the economy is overheating, demand should be reduced 
through tax increases and spending cuts. Monetary policy is supposed to be "ac-
commodating" - that is to finance fiscal expansion at low interest rates and to 
avoid a collapse of domestic demand during fiscal retrenchment. Having been 
conceived in response to the Great Depression of the 1930s, the overriding goal 
of the Keynesian paradigm was to maintain full employment. In the U.S. and the 
U.K. it worked reasonably well in combating recessions during the early post-
war decades. Even then, however, it was obvious that fiscal retrenchment was 
politically much more difficult to implement than fiscal expansion - which im-
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plied continuous inflationary pressures and a steady accumulation of public-
sector debt 
Moreover, the British experience demonstrated that - under conditions of an 
industrial-relations system with powerful and competitive unions - an effective 
incomes policy should have been a necessary complement to fiscal Keynesian-
ism. Without it, expansionary fiscal impulses were quickly consumed by wage 
increases. Because statutory wage controls did not seem to work, governments 
tried to contain wage-push inflation through stop-go policies that never allowed 
steady economic growth to take off. In the "stagflation" period of the 1970s, 
when the oil price crisis combined the cballenges of demand-deficient unem-
ployment and cost-push inflation, the Keynesian model finally failed almost 
everywhere. Fiscal expansion would have accelerated inflation, and fiscal re-
trenchment would have driven up mass unemployment - and in fact most coun-
tries ended up with both. In a few countries, however, economically sophisticat-
ed and organisationally powerful and centralised unions were able to contain 
cost-push inflation through effective wage restraint, allowing fiscal and monetary 
reflation to prevent the rise of mass unemployment. 4 
The Monetarist paradigm, which has its theoretical roots in pre-Keynesian neo-
classical economics, s owed its practical appeal to the collapse of Keynesian 
policies in the 1970s. From a political-science perspective, however, its greatest 
comparative advantage was its lesser dependence on politically salient policy 
choices. Abandoning the political commitment to full employment, the Monetar-
ist paradigm assigned the leading role to the monetary policy of an independent 
central bank, whose paramount function is to maintain price stability. Beyond 
that, it ensures a steady money supply sufficient to allow non-inflationary eco-
nomic growth. Whether this could be realised in practice then depended entirely 
on the willingness of governments and unions to adjust their claims on the total 
economic product to the monetary corridor defined by the central bank. 
The German Bundesbank was the fust to establish a Monetarist regime in the 
early 1970s. After having dramatically demonstrated the destructive potential of 
monetary retrenchment in the crisis of 1973/4, the Bank did in fact confront the 
government and the unions with the offer of an implicit "social compact" .6 It 
4 Sclwrpf. F. W.: Crisis aod Otoice in European Social Democrtcy,llhaca, 1991. 
S Joluuon, H. G.: The Keynesian Revolution and tbe Mooelarist Counter Revolution, in: American Ero-
oomic Review 6112 (1971 ), 91-106. 
6 Sclwrpf. F. W., Crisis and Choice, op. cit., 1991, 128-139. 
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took great pains to explain to the government, unions, and public, how coordina-
tion by monetary policy would not only ensure price stability but also produce 
economically superior and politically justifiable macroeconomic outcomes. Once 
rampant inflation was brought under control, it would precisely monitor the state 
of the German economy and pre-announce annual monetary targets by reference 
to the current "output gap". Maximum non-inflationary growth would then be 
achieved if fiscal policy merely were to allow the "automatic stabilisers" to rise 
and fall over the business cycle, and if wages were to rise with labour productivi-
ty. Thus, fiscal policy would be relieved of its heroic Keynesian role, and unions 
would no longer be pressured to enact a countercyclical incomes policy. 
In other words, responsibility for the management of the economy would be 
assumed by the "non-political" monetary policy of the independent Bank, 
whereas non-inflationary fiscal and wage policies could be conducted with a low 
political profile. And as governments and unions did learn to play by the Bank's 
new rules, the Monetarist regime did in fact work reasonably well, economically 
and politically, for Germany.7 
Ill. From Monetarism In One Country to Monetary Union 
Originally, Monetarist as well as Keynesian models had been designed for na-
tional economies which were exposed to international competition in product 
markets, but retained control over their monetary regimes. For both, therefore, 
increasing capital mobility would raise difficulties. Keynesian reflation would 
become prohibitively expensive if the central bank was no longer able to main-
tain low interest rates; and monetary policy could not be targeted to the "output 
gap" of the national economy if interest rates were determined by the fluctua-
tions of international capital markets. This became obvious in the early 1980s, 
when German recovery was crushed as the Bundesbank found it necessary to 
follow the dramatic increase of American interest rates, or when fiscal reflation 
in France had to be aborted under the pressure of massive capital flights. At the 
same time, capital mobility had also increased the volatility of exchange rates, 
which was seen as a major problem for exporters in integrated product markets. 
7 This is a stylised account that does not apply to conflicts in 1991-92 when the Bank dmti<:ally (and 




There were several reasons, therefore, for European governments to be interested 
in creating a common European monetary regime. 8 
The fmt such attempt, the European "Snake in the Tunnel" of 1972, had quickly 
disintegrated in the oil-price crisis. Subsequently, the "European Monetary Sys-
tem" (EMS) of 1979 committed its Member States to peg their currencies to a 
currency basket (the ••ECU''). But since Germany was the biggest economy and 
the most important trading partner for most other Member States, the EMS 
meant in fact that their currencies were pegged to the Deutschmark - which also 
implied that in order stay within the agreed-upon bandwidth, their central banks 
needed to mirror the stability-oriented monetary policy of the Bundesbank. For 
the other Member States, this turned out to be difficult for several reasons: 
First, German monetary policy continued to be precisely targeted to German 
conditions which could differ from those of the other member economies. Hence 
when, in 1992, the Bank decided to punish Helmut Kohl for the deficit-financing 
of German unification, other economies suffered as well - and the U.K. and 
Sweden (that had only recently joined the EMS) were catapulted out of the Mon-
etary System by currency speculation. Moreover, governments and unions that 
had not gone through the harrowing German experiences of 1973-75 and 1981-
82 did not necessarily appreciate the awesome power of monetary constraints. 
Nor had their central banks a background of institutional autonomy, experience 
and credibility that would have allowed them to intervene with equal authority 
against public-sector deficits and wage settlements that diverged from the path 
defined for Germany. 
Even more important, however, were the institutional differences in national 
wage-setting systems. The Monetarist regime worked in Germany because wage 
leadership was exercised by large and economically sophisticated industrial 
unions that had learned to operate within the monetary constraints. In contrast, 
countries with powerful but fragmented and competitive unions and decentral-
ised wage-setting institutions simply did not have the capacity to contain the 
inflationary pressures of wage competition. 9 
8 It should be DOted. however, that the initiatives wete comiog from Germany. With the breakup of the 
Brettoo-Woods regime. German producers had lost the prorection of an lllldervalued cwreocy, and cur-
I'CIIC)' fluctuations wete particularly unfavorable for export-<Jriented iovestmellt-goods branches operat-
illg with high fixed costs. 
9 llacauo, L/Simoni, M.: OrganizatiOilAI Detennirumts of Wage Moderation. in: World Politics 6'114 
(2010).~5. 
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As a consequence, inflation rates (Figure 1, cf. Appendix) and unit labour costs 
(Figure 2) continued to differ; and in order to compensate for losses in interna-
tional competitiveness, exchange rates and bandwidths were frequently re-
adjusted. As devaluation remained a possibility, the risk premia of government 
bonds differed considerably among EMS Member States (Figure 3). Moreover, 
any attempt to defend unrealistic exchange rates would invite currency specula-
tion.10 
These problems persuaded European governments that moving from the EMS to 
a monetary union with irrevocably fixed exchange rates would be desirable. It 
would end their dependence on the Bundesbank, and it would eliminate the pos-
sibility of devaluation - and hence both the risk of currency speculation, and the 
interest-rate differentials caused by the risk of devaluation. Germany in turn, 
which had much to lose in a monetary union 11 but was willing to accept it as the 
political price for German unification, was able to insist that the Bundesbank and 
its version of Monetarism should become the model for the European system. 
and that candidate countries would have to meet tough convergence criteria as a 
condition of admission. 12 
In effect, therefore, the Maastricht Treaty protected the institutional independ-
ence of the European Central Bank (ECB) even more firmly than had been the 
case in Germany. And to ensure its Monetarist orientation, the priority of price 
stability was specified in the Treaty as well. Moreover, in order to gain access to 
the Monetary Union, EU Member States had to remove all restrictions on capital 
mobility, to stabilise their exchange rates to the ECU, and to achieve conver-
gence on low rates of inflation and low public sector deficits. 
I 0 De Grauwe argues dlll1 frequent small adj\1$1Jllents bad worked well until 1987, and that it was the 
attempt to move towaRI more fixed exchange l'ltes and greater convergeuce dlll1 made the EMS too rigid 
and then invited large-scale <:U1'I'CIICY speculalioa; cf. CH Grauwe, P.: Economics of Moaetary Union, 8• 
Editioa. Oxford, 2009, 137-142. 
11 The main loss, as will soon become clear, was tbe goodness-of-fit of monetary policy. But from the 
perspective of export-oriented German industries, the pre-Maastricht EMS had also been an ideal ar-
rangement. It was sufficiently effective in dampening cUJTeDCy fluctuations. And it also maintained the 
Deutschmark as an undervalued <:U1'I'CIICY as other Member States always tried, but never quite succeed-
ed, to match tbe German passion for stabilily. This advantage was lost as olher oountries intensified their 
efforts to meet the Maastridlt criteria on price stabilily, and as Germany came to adopt the Euro at an 
overvalued exchange rate. 
12 IHlon, J.: Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Communily, Brussels, 1989; 
McN(DII(Jro, K.R.: The CwTeucy of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Unioa, lthaca. 1998; Dy-
son. KJFemhentone, K.: The Road to Maastricbt: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Unioa, Oxford, 
1999; JaMs, E.: The Politics of Economic and Monetary Unioa: Jntegratioa and Jdiosycracy, La.nham. 
2002; Vaubel. R.: The Euro and the German Veto, in: Econ Journal Watch 7/1 (2010), 82-90. 
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Perhaps unexpectedly, these "Maasbicht criteria" on inflation, deficits, and ex-
change-rate stability were in fact met by a considerable number of unlikely can-
didate counbies - sometimes through creative accounting, but mainly through 
heroic efforts at budget consolidation and "social pacts" whose short-term effec-
tiveness was not necessarily sustainable over the longer term. In an attempt to 
forestall future lapses, Germany therefore also insisted on a "Stability and 
Growth Pact" that defined permanent limits on national deficits and indebtedness 
together with seemingly tough sanctioning procedures. 13 
IV. From 1999 to 2007: Monetarism In a Non-optimal Currency Area 
Initially, the Monetary Union did indeed fulfil the hopes of its supporters. The 
widely resented dominance of the Bundesbank was replaced by a common Euro-
pean Central Bank that targeted its policy choices on average inflation rates and 
output gaps in the eurozone, rather than on the state of the German economy. 
National inflation rates that had steeply declined in the run-up to the euro contin-
ued to remain significantly lower than they had been in the 1990s (Figure 4) and, 
most importantly, financial markets honoured the elimination of devaluation 
risks, so that interest rates on government bonds and commercial credit declined 
steeply to the German level in all EMU Member States (Figure 3). The result 
was an initial boost to economic growth in those eurozone economies where 
interest rates had fallen - which of course was not the case in Germany (Figure 
5). Despite the pre-1999 convergence, therefore, Member States entered the 
EMU in significantly differing economic circumstances. 
Such conditions had been discussed earlier under rubric of whether the EMU 
could be considered an "optimum currency area" - defmed by high mobility of 
capital and labour and the availability of inter-regional transfers to deal with the 
possibility of "asymmetric shocks" .14 
13 Heipem. M./Verrbm, A.: RuliDg Europe: The Politics of tbe Stability and Growth Pact, Cambridge, 
2010. 
14 MundeU, R.A: A Tbeary of Optimal Currency Areas, in: American Economic Review 51/4 (1961), 657-
665; McKinnon, R.l.: Optimum Curreocy Areas, in: American Economic Review 5314 (1963), 717-725; 
Eicheng'""' B.: Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?, CFJ>R Discussioo Paper 478, London, 1990; 
Eicheng'""' B./Frieden, J. (eds.): The Political Bcooomy of European Mooetary Unification, Boulder, 
1994. 
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When compared to the United States, these conditions were lacking in Europe.15 
But given the political commitment to monetary unification, and the encouraging 
effects of national efforts to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria, optimism 
prevailed: Considering national public-sector deficits as the main challenge to 
price stability, and assuming that the Stability Pact would effectively control 
these, it was expected that the increasing integration of capital and goods mar-
kets would also ensure a continuing convergence of prices, wages and business 
cycles. 16 As it turned out, however, these expectations were misleading17 for two 
related reasons: 
On the one hand, the political crash programs, through which unlikely candidate 
countries had achieved an impressive convergence on the Maastricht criteria, had 
generally not addressed the underlying structural and institutional differences 
that had originally caused economic divergence. Once access was achieved, 
these differences would reassert themselves. 18 
On the other hand, ECB monetary impulses reflected average economic condi-
tions in the eurozone and hence could not be targeted at the conditions of specific 
national economies. In effect, therefore, the crucial precondition of Monetarism 
- a precise fit between money supply and growth potential of a specific economy 
- would not exist in a heterogeneous monetary union. In other words, the Euro-
pean Central Bank could not be expected to reproduce the Bundesbank 's success 
in Germany. Instead of ensuring steady, inflation-free economic growth in the 
IS lArs Jom111g and Eoill Drea provide a comprebensive survey of American economic analyses of Euro-
pean monetary integration from 1989 to 2002. They argue that initial skepticism was based on a static 
interpretation of the optimal c:urreocy area that ign<ll'(d the dynamic impact of c:urreocy union on trade 
and factor mobility, and that a more optimistic view also came to prevail in academic analyses as the 
success of the Maastricht convergenc:e criteria became apparent. Rtnuutably, however, none of these 
contributions seem to have focused on differences in wage-setting sysleiiiS as a factor affecting the con-
ditions of "optimality", and it appears as if only Milton Friedman was explicitly wonied about the eft'ect 
of unitary monetary policy on divergent member economies (cf. JCHU~~Jg, L./Drea, E.: It Can't Happen, 
It's a Bad Idea, It Won't Last: US Economists on the EMU and the Euro, 1989-2002, in: Econ Journal 
Watcll7/1 (2010), 4-52, esp. 29). 
16 /:s:sillg, 0.: On Macroeconomic Policy Co-ordination in EMU, in: Journal of Common MaJtet Studies 
4012 (2002), 345-358. 
17 They were right in predicting that (1) monetary union would increase trade flows and capital flows, and 
that (2) increasing trade flows under a common cunency would tend to equalise the prices of tradable 
goods lllld services. There was no reason to think, however, that (3) prices in the non-traded sector 
would also be equalised. Thus differences in inflation rates could persist even though the euro-level av-
erage rate WIIS conslrained by BCB monetacy policy, lllld even though differences in consumer prices 
were reduced by price convergence in the b'aded sector. 
18 WiUett. T.D./Permpoot~. 0./W'Jhlbo"B, C.: Endogenous OCA Analysis lllld the Early Euro Experience, 
in: The World Economy 33fl (2010), 851-872. 
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member economies of the EMU, the ECB's uniform monetary policy would 
amplify deviant dynamics in economies above and below the average. 19 
For countries with below-average rates of economic growth and inflation, the 
uniform ECB interest rates were too high, and the real interest rates faced by 
domestic consumers and investors were even higher - with the consequence that 
initially weak economic activity was depressed even further by restrictive mone-
tary impulses. For countries with above-average rates of inflation, by contrast, 
ECB monetary policy was too loose, nominal interest rates were too low, and 
real interest rates became extremely low or even negative (Figure 6). Thus, the 
boost to economic activity that former weak-currency countries had received 
through the fall of nominal interest to Gennan levels was subsequently intensi-
fied and accelerated by ECB monetary policy. 
In dealing with the dynamics introduced by mis-specified monetary impulses, the 
Monetary Union left Member States to their own devices. Since the "non-
political" monetary and exchange-rate instruments of macroeconomic manage-
ment were Europeanised, this meant that governments would again have to resort 
to those "Keynesian" instruments of fiscal and incomes policy which, because of 
their much greater political salience, had failed in most countries when they were 
employed in the 1970s. But this is not the complete story. like its Keynesian 
counterpart, Monetarist theory is ostensibly concerned with the management of 
aggregate economic demand. But unlike Keynesianism, its "micro foundations" 
are provided by neoclassical micro-economics and its postulate of perfect mar-
kets. For its promoters, it therefore seemed plausible to consider problems that 
might still arise under a Monetarist regime as the consequence of imperfectly 
flexible product and labour markets. In practice, therefore, demand-oriented 
Monetarist macroeconomics was typically associated with a panoply of "supply-
side" policy recommendations, including tax cuts, privatisation, liberalisation, 
deregulation and, if need be, union busting (all of which had been part of Marga-
ret Thatcher's and Ronald Reagan's Monetarist programs). There is no question, 
however, that the use of these instruments would also have very high political 
salience in EMU member polities. 
19 Si1111, H.W./Widgrln. M./KOthenbiirger, M. (eds.): European Mooetary Integration, Cambridge (M.A.), 
2004; Enderlein, H.: Nationale Wirtschaftspolililc in der europliscben Wllbnmgsunioo, Frankfwt a.M., 
2004. 
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1. Germany: The Sick Man of Europe Rescued by Union Wage Restraint 
The first victim of mis-specified monetary impulses was Germany.20 Before 
1999, not only nominal interest rates, but also real interest rates had been lowest 
in Germany. With entry into the Monetary Union, however, these comparative 
advantages were lost. Since nominal interest rates converged whereas German 
inflation rates continued to be lower, real interest rates in Germany became the 
highest in the eurozone (Figure 6). As a consequence, economic growth was 
lower in Germany than in almost all EMU member economies (Figure 5), unem-
ployment increased dramatically from 2000 to 2005 (Figure 7), as did social 
expenditures, whereas tax revenues fell by 2.4 percentage points from 2000 to 
2004. 
In responding to this deep recession, Germany could not rely on any one of the 
instruments of macroeconomic management. Where the Bundesbank would have 
lowered interest rates in response to the rapidly increasing output gap, ECB in-
terest rates were causing the problem. And where an autonomous government 
would have resorted to fiscal reflation, Germany came to violate the 3-percent 
deficit limit of the Stability Pact by merely allowing the "automatic stabilisers" 
to operate. And as monetary as well as fiscal reflation was ruled out, incomes 
policy also could not be employed as an instrument for demand expansion. Even 
if unions, in the face of rising mass unemployment, had been able to achieve 
wage increases exceeding productivity gains plus inflation, the positive effect on 
domestic demand would have been overshadowed by job losses due to reduced 
profitability and falling export demand. 
Instead, Germany's large industrial unions in the export sectors decided to pro-
tect existing jobs through wage restraint - a supply-side strategy that allowed 
employers to capture most of the productivity gains in the hope of stabilising 
employment by improving the profitability of domestic production and the com-
petitiveness of German industries in international markets.21 At the same time, 
however, stagnant or falling real wages (Figure 8) would further reduce domestic 
demand and keep inflation below the EMU average - with negative effects on 
20 Spethmann, D.!Steiger, 0.: Deutschlands Wll'tscbaft. seine Scbulden Wld die Unzulllnglichkeiten cl« 
einheidichen Geldpolitik im Burosystem. in: Detlev Ebrigll.Jwe Staroske (eds.): Dimensionen an-
gewandter Wirlschaftsforscb11118: Methoden, Regionen, Settoren. Festscbrift fllr Heinz Schlfer zum 65. 
Geburutag, Hamburg. 2005, 2Ss-28S. 
21 In real terms. German unions belped to re-establish the advancages of an lllldervalued cumocy - provid-
ing the fimctional equivaleuts of export subsidies and import duties in ways which could not be chal-
lenged under the EU's competition and intemal-martet roles. 
ZSE212011 175 
ABHANOLUNGENIANALYSES 
domestic economic growth and on imports. And the Red-Green government on 
its part, bereft of all demand-side policy options, was also pushed toward supply-
side policies. Between 2000 and 2005, the government managed to reduce taxes 
on company profits and capital incomes, to lower the level of employment pro-
tection, primarily by deregulating temporary and part-time employment (Figure 
9), and to drastically cut benefits to the long-term unemployed in order to reduce 
the reservation wage of job seekers. 22 There is no question that these policies 
were not only highly salient but also extremely unpopular, especially with the 
supporters of the social-democratic governing party. Mass demonstrations 
against the welfare reforms and the rise of a left-wing protest party brought about 
the defeat of the Red-Green government in the 2005 elections. Apart from this 
change in partisan fortunes, there is also a significant decline of lower-class 
electoral participation - which does indeed suggest a more serious erosion of 
political legitimacy. 23 
Economically, however, the combination of extreme wage restraint practiced by 
German unions and the government's supply-side policies achieved its desired 
effect. Export demand and, eventually, employment in the export industries and 
in a growing low-wage sector increased, and registered unemployment began to 
decline after 2005 (Figure 7). In effect, Germany, which had been the "sick man 
of Europe" between 2000 and 2005, managed to pull itself out of the long reces-
sion to become once more one of the strongest European economies at the onset 
of the international financial crisis in 2007. 
In an integrated economic environment, however, successful supply-side policies 
which reduce the cost and increase the profitability of domestic production in 
one country must inevitably have the effect of beggar-my-neighbour strategies 
on its competitors. 14 In the process of coping with its own crisis, therefore, Ger-
many also contributed to the economic vulnerability of other eurozone econo-
mies, and to the increasing current-account imbalances among these economies 
(Figure 10).2S 
22 Trampusch, Chr.: Der erschtipfte SozjaJslaat: Transfonnation eines Politi.kfeldes, Frankfurt a.M., 2009. 
23 Schlifer, A.: Consequences d Social Inequality for Democracy in Western Europe, in: Zeitscluift ftlr 
vergleicheoden Polititwissenscbaft 4 (2010). 
24 De GTIIIIWe, P •• Economics, op. cit., 2009; Fla.rsbeck, H.: Die Marlawirtschaft des 21. Jabdnmderts, 
FnnkfUrt a.M., 2010. 
25 The link is established by a combination of three different mecbanisiiiS: By cutting costs and constrain-
ing domestic demand, Germany inaeased exports and reduced imports in relation to the rest d tbe 
world. Since revenues from tbe expert surplus were 001 fully consumed or invested in Germany, !bey 
were available for investment and credit in those economies where, for reasons to be discussed below, 
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2. The Rise and Increasing Vulnerability of GIPS Economies 
In the former soft-currency countries - I will look at Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain, labelling them GIPS economies - accession to the EMU had the ini-
tial effect of interest rates falling to much lower German levels. The sudden 
availability of cheap capital, whose domestic attractiveness was further increased 
by near-zero or even negative real interest rates, fuelled credit-financed domestic 
demand in Greece, Ireland and Spain (though less so in Portugal, for reasons that 
I have not been able to explore). In Spain and Ireland, in particular, cheap credit 
came to finance real-estate investments and rapidly rising housing prices which, 
eventually, would turn into bubbles. As a consequence, economic growth (Fig-
ure 5), employment (Figure 11), per-capita incomes (Figure 12) and prices (Fig-
ure 4) continued to increase. At the same time, real wages (Figure 8) and unit 
labour costs (Figure 13) also increased.26 As a consequence, imports would rise, 
export competitiveness would suffer and deficits of current accounts would in-
crease (Figure 10). 
Even if they had considered the decline of their external balances a serious prob-
lem, however, the governments in GIPS economies found no effective way to 
counteract domestic booms that were driven by the cheap-money effect of uni-
form ECB interest rates. Spain and Ireland at least tried to achieve some restraint 
through the instruments of macroeconomic policy that were still available na-
tionally. But their attempts to contain wage inflation through a series of social 
pacts and to practice fiscal constraint by running budget surpluses (Figure 15) 
proved insufficient 27 What could have made a difference was monetary restraint, 
which would have impeded the credit-financed overheating of the Greek, Irish 
and Spanish economies. This, however, would have required differentiated, ra-
demand foc consumer and investment credit was particularly high. In elfect therefore, German capital 
exports came 10 finance rising imports and increasing indebtedness in recipient economies. 
26 The mechanism is complex: The initial fall of interest rates facilitated the rise of credit-financed con-
sumer and investment demand. In the traded sector, imports would rise, prices would be constrained, 
and employment might fall. In the non-traded sector, however, increasing demand would raise domestic 
production and employment and create room foc wage increases. Whether it will be exploited depmds 
on national wage-setting institutions. In Sweden and Austria, centralised wage bargaining was gena-ally 
able to prevent increases that would hurt international competitiveness in the traded sector. In Germany, 
the same effect is traditionally achieved by the wage leadership of the big industrial unions. But where 
such institutions do not exist, union competition and egalitarian oonns of "comparability" will favor the 
diffusion of wage increases achieved in branches with the gRates! ability 10 pay, or the least ability to 
resist (cf. Scharpf, F. W., Crisis and Choice, op. cit., 1991; Baccoro, L/SilriOfti, M., op. cit., 2010). In the 
traded sector, therefore. wages may rise even as employment is shrinking. 
X7 &ccoro,l./Simoni, M .. op. cit., 2010. 
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ther than uniform. monetary policies that would not be defined by eurozone 
averages but targeted to the specific conditions and problems of the individual 
economies.28 Such approaches,29 however, played no role in the construction of 
either the European Monetary Union or of the Stability Pact,30 nor were they 
considered by mainstream monetary economics prior to the present crisis. 31 Un-
der the dominant view, the ECB was responsible only for average price stability 
in the eurozone as a whole, whereas all adjustment problems of individual econ-
omies were to be dealt with by EMU Member States. 
At the onset of the financial crisis, the GIPS economies therefore found them-
selves in extremely vulnerable positions defined by severe current-account defi-
cits, an extreme dependence on capital inflows and severely overvalued real 
exchange rates. For countries with independent currencies (unless that currency 
was the U.S. Dollar), this process could not have continued for long. Under fixed 
exchange rates, it would be stopped by a balance-of-payments crisis, and under 
flexible rates, devaluation would raise the price of imports and restore the com-
petitiveness of exports. In the Monetary Union, however, external constraints 
were eliminated. Foreign investors and creditors were no longer concerned about 
currency risks, and banks in countries such as Germany were happy to re-invest 
export incomes in bonds and asset-based securities issued by Greek, Spanish or 
Irish banks. Hence the rapidly increasing deficits of current accounts were not 
corrected, but financed through equally increasing capital flows from surplus to 
28 De G1U11We (Economics. op. cit., 2009, 177-182) shows how the higbecioterestrates required (UIIder tbe 
'-raylor rule") for high growth economies such as Ireland, Greece or Spain would be systematically out-
voced in the ECB Governing Council under the inflnence of tbe ECB Board whose members are as-
sumed 10 laJ'Bel averqe eurozooe cooditions. 
29 In the history of economic theory, tbe need for and the feasibility of diffi:a'entialed solulions had been 
pos1Uiared by the renowned Swedish economist Erik LindoJrJ (cf. IiNlohl, E.: Penningpolitikens Medel 
(The Means of MOIIelal')' Policy), Lund, 1930). In his view, the central bank of a IDOIIelal}' unioo of in-
dependent Slates would need to c:orrec1 diverging busiDe$$ cycles and inflati011 rates in member ec:ooo-
mies by differenlialing the supply of central-bank lllOIIeY that national central banks could otTer to na-
tional banks - which would in 111m lead 10 nalionally differing interest rates. It has recently been argued, 
albeit by belerodox ec:onomisls, lbat such options could also be rulised in the EMU (Spethmann. 
D./Steiger, 0., op. cit., 2005). 
30 Heipem, M./VerdN, A., op. cil., 2010. 
31 De GrtJJ~We, P., Econc:mics, op. cil, 2009; De G~t~~~we, P.: The Governance of a Fragile Eurozooe, 
University of Leuven, 2011. One would of course need 10 know wbelher, under ~ cooditions of 
high capilal mobility, the effect of differentiated lllOIIelal')' policies would be immedialely wiped out by 
lllbittage, or wbetber some forms of capilal C0011'0ls could be designed 10 ensure their effectiv-. 
Moreover, one would have 10 explore the political and inlra-instillllional implications for ECB 111011e1ary 
policy if it were 10 become responsible for explicitly discriminatinJ measures addressed 10 individual 
member ec:ooomies. 
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deficit economies in the eurozone (Figure 14). By the same token, of course, real 
effective exchange rates diverged as well, with Germany benefitting from an 
increasingly undervalued currency, and GIPS economies suffering from over-
valuation (Figure 17). 
What eventually mattered most was the increasing dependence on capital inflows 
and the rise of external- and mainly private32 - indebtedness, which left GIPS 
economies extremely vulnerable to disturbances in international financial mar-
kets that might provoke capital flight.33 Hence, even if the toughened version of 
the Stability Pact that is presently being enacted had been in place in 2007, it 
would have done little to reduce the economic vulnerability of the GIPS econo-
mies. In any event, however, under the rules of the Monetary Union that were 
then in place, neither rising current-accounts deficits nor the increasing depend-
ence of GIPS economies on capital imports and divergent real exchange rates 
were treated as problems that might require intervention by either the Commis-
sion or the European Central Bank. 
The Stability Pact was supposed to deal only with excessive budget deficits 
(Figure 15) and. what is even more important, it did not differentiate between 
deficits incurred in a recession or in high-growth periods. Thus after Germany 
(with the support of France) had successfully resisted punishment for operating 
automatic stabilisers during its deep recession between 2000 and 2005, it would 
have been politically difficult to prosecute high-growth Greece (even if its deficit 
had been correctly reported). But while the Stability Pact could and should have 
been invoked against Greece, it was simply irrelevant for Spain and Ireland. 
Compared to Germany, their governments were models of fiscal probity, running 
budget surpluses in most years up to 2007, and reducing total public-sector debt 
far below the official target of 60 percent of GDP (Figure 16). Even though, in 
the absence of monetary restraint, sound macroeconomic management might 
have required even more aggressive fiscal retrenchment, there was nothing in the 
32 In contrast to the CIUTelldy popular nanatives, external indebtedness even in Greece and Portugal was 
mainly, and in Spain IIJ1d Ireland exclusively due to private-sector radler than public-sector borrowing. 
Thus in 2007, lhe year prior to the financial crisis, lhe Greece's external balance bad amounted to 
-14.67% of GDP, to which public-sector borrowing contributed only -5.3%. The respective figures for 
Portugal were -9.78% and -2.65%. In Spain (-10.02% and+ 1.09%) and Ireland (-5.34% and +0.14%), 
public sector surpluses bad actually reduced tbe external imbalance (Eurostat data). 
33 Excessive external indebtedness Cll1l$ed by capital inflows did, of course. also occur in countries with 
their own currency whose central bank had stimulated the demand for credit through low interest rates. 
But in that case, a sudden capital flight would produce devaluation. ralher than a liquidity and solvency 
crisis (cf. De Gmuwe, P., Governuce. op. cit., 2011 ). 
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Stability Pact to suggest to governments that this might be a European require-
ment. 
At the same time, the ECB also saw no reason for alarm as average eurozone 
inflation rates remained within the limits to which its monetary policy was com-
mitted. And while all GIPS economies had higher rates than Germany, these 
were not exorbitantly higher and seemed not to accelerate (Figure 4). This may 
appear surprising since the bursting of credit-financed real-estate bubbles in 
Ireland and Spain is now seen as a major cause of the present crisis in these 
countries. But technically, escalating real-estate and housing prices are defined 
as "asset price inflation" which the ECB, like other central banks, will only take 
into account when its "wealth effect" is expected to also affect the rise of con-
sumer prices.34 Furthermore, the rise of consumer prices in GIPS economies 
continued to be constrained by lower-priced imports. 
3. Summary: The Eurozone on the Eve of the Crisis 
By 2007, conditions in the eurozone could therefore be described as follows: the 
Monetary Union had achieved its proximate political purposes by eliminating 
currency fluctuations and interest-rate differentials among its member econo-
mies. At the same time, however, it had deprived member governments of the 
monetary and exchange-rate instruments of macroeconomic management and it 
had tried, through the Stability Pact, to also constrain their employment of fiscal 
instruments. But since the eurozone was not an "optimal currency area", the 
imposition of one-size-fits-all ECB interest rates produced "asymmetric" impuls-
es in EMU economies, with above-average or below-average rates of growth and 
inflation. In low-growth Germany, high real interest rates had deepened and 
prolonged a recession which, since monetary as well as fiscal reflation were 
ruled out, was eventually overcome through wage restraint and supply-side ••re-
forms" that constrained domestic demand and increased export competitiveness. 
In GIPS economies, by contrast, very low real interest rates had fuelled credit-
financed economic growth and employment, but also rapid increases in unit 
34 Triclu!t, J .. c.: Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy. Lecture by tbe President of the European 
Central Bank at the Mooetary Authority of Singapore, 08.06.2005; De Grouwe, P., &ooomica, op. cit., 
2009, 'JfJ7-1JYJ. Wilh bindsigbt, it seems obvious that the Irish and Spanish (or American and British) 
govemmeoiS could have halted their mll-estate bubbles through legislatioo tigllleoing tbe availability of 
housing c:mlit. But if even central-bank economists see no way to distinguish between price ina-eases 
detennined by "ratimal markets" and ''speculative" excases, it would have taken a good deal of politi-
cal cou.rage for governments to ''stop the party" on grounds of old-fashioned patemalism. 
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labour costs that reduced export competitiveness. The resulting rise of current-
account deficits was accommodated by equally rising capital inflows from inves-
tors in surplus economies leading to rising external debts accumulated primarily 
or exclusively in the private sector. As a consequence. GIPS economies were 
becoming extremely vulnerable to potential disturbances in international finan-
cial markets that might induce capital flight - followed by potential liquidity and 
solvency crises. 
Governments in GIPS countries may have been as unconcerned as the American 
or British governments about the rise of these imbalances. But even where they 
tried to constrain their overheating economies, through fiscal retrenchment and 
attempts at wage moderation, the instruments of macroeconomic policy that were 
still available to national governments proved insufficient to neutralise the ex-
pansionary effects of EMU monetary impulses. At the same time, the escalating 
economic imbalances and vulnerabilities were also of no concern to EMU policy 
makers, neither for the Commission enforcing the Stability Pact nor for the ECB 
carrying out its mandate to ensure price stability. 
V. From 2008 to 2010: A Sequence of Three Crises 
The question as to how long the external imbalances in the eurozone could have 
continued, and whether they could have been gradually corrected by market 
forces or would soon have ended in a crash. has become academic. In the real 
world, the international financial crisis of 2008 triggered chain reactions which. 
in the eurozone. bad the effect of transforming the vulnerability of deficit coun-
tries into a systemic crisis that is thought to challenge the viability of the Mone-
tary Union itself. The much-researched story is far too complex to be retold here 
in any detail, but for present purposes a thumb-nail sketch of three distinct, but 
causally connected crises will suffice.35 
Initially, the direct impact of the American .. subprime mortgage crisis" and the 
Lebman bankruptcy was limited to European countries that had allowed their 
banks to invest heavily in ''toxic" American securities. Apart from the UK. the 
main victims were Germany and Ireland, whereas banking regulations in Spain 
bad effectively prevented Spanish banks from engaging in off-balance activities 
abroad. As a consequence, the budget deficits of countries that had to rescue 
35 Jones, E.: The Euro and the Financial Crisis, in: Survival Sin (2009), 41-54. 
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.. system-relevant" private or public banks, escalated to previously unheard-of 
levels (Figure 15). 
The secondary impact of the international financial crisis was a dramatic credit 
squeeze on the real economy as banks had to write off insecure assets on their 
balance sheets while mutual distrust brought interbank lending to a halt. As a 
consequence, economic activity declined and unemployment increased in those 
countries immediately affected by the banking crisis, with these effects spreading 
quickly to other closely-linked economies. In addition to the fiscal effects of 
bank bailouts, governments therefore had to accept a steep decline in tax reve-
nues and an equally steep rise in expenditures on unemployment and on the pro-
tection of existing jobs. Obviously, however, the effects of the credit squeeze hit 
hardest those countries whose economic activity had come to depend most on the 
availability of cheap credit and massive capital inflows- which in the eurozone 
was the case for GIPS economies. In Ireland and Spain, moreover, the real-estate 
bubble had burst under the impact of the recession, and mortgage defaults creat-
ed a secondary banking crisis in which governments had to rescue even more 
financial institutions (or their creditors in financial institutions of surplus econo-
mies). The result was an even more dramatic rise of public-sector deficits and 
debt ratios even in countries such as Spain and Ireland whose indebtedness had 
been far below the eurozone average (Figure 16). 
In the process, thirdly (and belatedly), international rating agencies and investors 
ceased to be satisfied with the elimination of currency risks and finally began to 
worry about the sustainability of public-sector indebtedness - in particular for 
those countries whose current-account deficits suggested economic weaknesses 
that might also affect the government's capacity to meet financial commitments. 
As this happened, the price of outstanding bonds declined, refinancing as well as 
the placement of new issues became difficult, and the convergence of nominal 
interest rates to German levels came to an end. As a consequence, after 2008, 
risk premia on sovereign debt rose to very high and practically prohibitive levels 
(Figure 18). 
The spectre of "sovereign default" arose first in Greece. There, the incoming 
Pasok government had to admit that public sector deficits (which had significant-
ly violated the Stability Pact even during the high-growth years following acces-
sion to the eurozone in 2001) had in fact been grossly under-reported by its pre-
decessors. Confronted with the potential repercussions of Greek bankruptcy on 
their own banks, and with speculative attacks on other EMU Member States, 
capital-exporting countries agreed to create a common "Stability Mechanism" 
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that would ensure Greek government obligations - this was soon followed by the 
much larger European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) whose guarantees were 
first invoked by Ireland and now also by Portugal. In each case, governments had 
to accept extremely tough commitments to fiscal retrenchment and supply-side 
policy reforms - which are now becoming the model for a general regime of 
fiscal supervision and control in the eurozone. 
VI. Beyond the Rescue Operations: Options for a VIable EMU? 
The commitment to create a rescue fund must be understood in the light of its 
perceived alternative: if GIPS states had gone bankrupt they could have left the 
Monetary Union and returned to their former national currencies at an exchange 
rate that corrected the real effective over-valuation. In theory, this would have re-
established the international viability of their economies. But domestically, the 
transition would have been very painful, and its technical difficulties were per-
ceived as being so overwhelming36 that no practical solutions in that direction 
were even tentatively considered. At the same time, the European Commission, 
the ECB and the governments of surplus countries also rejected the .. bankruptcy-
cum-devaluation" scenario for reasons of their own which, not necessarily in the 
order importance, could be listed as follows: (1) if GIPS states left the EMU, it 
would be perceived as a major setback for European integration; (2) it would 
encourage speculative attacks on other EMU Member States; (3) bankruptcies of 
GIPS states would entail heavy losses for banks in surplus countries and for the 
ECB; and (4) the expected revaluation of the euro would hurt export industries in 
Germany and other surplus economies that benefited from an undervalued real 
exchange rate. Given these beliefs, expensive guarantees and credits appeared as 
a lesser evil that was necessary to keep GIPS countries within the Monetary 
Union (and, perhaps, to provide a push for European solidarity and political 
integration). 
36 As George Se I gin pu1 it: "In effect, the authorities kicked away the ladder Europe's ecooomies had 
scaled to establish a common currency, leaving Europeans with no equally coovenient way of retmlling 
to the status quo." 11uas, American eoonomists who had warned against aeating the EMU were now 
coovinced lbat the exit optioo was effectively fnrecl~. Cl. Selgill. G.: The Secret of the Euro's Suc-
cess, in: Econ Journal Watch 7/1 (2010), 78-81; Eichengreen, B., op. c:it, 1990; Eichengreen. B.: The 
Euro: Love k or Leave k?, NBER Working Paper 13393, 2010. 
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1. The Rescue-cum-Retrenchment Program 
The immediate goal of the rescue programs was to avoid bankruptcy by provid-
ing access to credit at rates that did not include exorbitant risk: premia. This goal 
is being pursued through a combination of guarantees, ECB open market opera-
tions37 and direct loans provided by the IMF, and by the stability funds set up by 
the EU (EFSM) and by the EMU Member States (EFSF). As a consequence, 
Greece, Ireland and now Portugal have so far been able to avoid insolvency. By 
themselves, however, the guarantees and credits can only buy time. In order to 
ensure that governments will be able to restore the confidence of financial mar-
kets, they are coupled with stringent .. conditionalities" which are meant to reduce 
the short-term need for credit through rigorous fiscal retrenchment. At the same 
time, moreover, the conditions imposed are meant to facilitate economic recov-
ery and to restore the international viability of the economies in question. 
Thus, the Commission's .. Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece" of May 
2010 postulated two goals to be pursued over the coming years: 
'"The immediate priority is to contain the government's financing needs and reassure 
markets of the determination of authorities to do whatever it takes to secure medium-
and long-term fiscal sustainability. ( ... ) 
In parallel with short-tenn anti-crisis fiscal measures, there is a need to prepare and 
implement an ambitious struciUral reform agenda to strengthen external competitive-
ness, accelerate reallocation of resources from the non-tradable to the tradable sector, 
and foster growth. "38 
The Program accordingly included immediate increases of VAT and excise tax-
es, cuts to public-sector wages, pensions, social expenditures and public invest-
ments, and would continue from 2011-2014 with a long list of further tax in-
creases and expenditure cutbacks. The structural reforms to which the 
government had to commit itself included "the implementation of an ambitious 
pension reform", reforms of the budgeting and tax systems and of public admin-
istration, plus "ambitious labour and product market reforms." 
Even though some of these commitments might have appeared somewhat vague, 
they were specified in much greater detail and continuously tightened by a 
"Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality'' 
and its quarterly ''updates". These are used to assess progress achieved, to extend 
37 Sinn, H.-W.: Die riskante KreditersatzpolitikderEZB, in: FAZ, 04.05.2011, 10. 
38 Europet~~~ COlfllrlission: The Ecooomic Adjustmeot Programme for Greece, Directorate-Oeoaal for 
Economic and Financial Affain, Occasional Papers61, Brussels, 2010, I MO. 
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the range of required structural reforms and to specify concrete requirements to 
be met in the following periods.39 These Memoranda cut ever more deeply into 
details of national legislation.40 And the opening paragraphs of the Greek and 
Irish Memoranda and of all subsequent updates leave no doubt as to who is in 
control of these "understandings": 
'"The quarterly disbursements of bilateral financial assistance ... are subject to quar-
terly reviews of conditionality for the duration of the arrangement. The release of the 
trancbes will be based on observance of quantitative performance criteria and a posi-
tive evaluation of progress made wilh respect to policy criteria in ... this memoran-
dum.( ... ) 
The authorities commit to consult with lhe European Commission, the ECB and lhe 
IMF on lhe adoption of policies that are not consistent with this Memorandum. They 
will also provide the European Commission, lhe ECB and the IMF with all informa-
tion requested that is available to monitor progress during programme implementa-
tion and to track the economic and financial situation. Prior to the release of the in-
stalments, the authorities shall provide a compliance report on the fulfilment of the 
conditionality.'741 
In other words, once an EMU Member State has applied for the protection of 
European rescue funds, its government will be operating under a form of "re-
ceivership".42 European and IMF authorities define the criteria to be treated as 
"conditionality"; the Commission analyzes financial and economic problems, 
defines the policy choices that are required, monitors compliance and evaluates 
progress or failure. Of course it prefers to do this in consultation with national 
authorities and expertise. But in cases of disagreement, the bargaining power of 
the national government will be minimal - except that it might still threaten to 
39 Exactly the same approadllw been ll$ed in lbe "Economic Adjustment Programme fur Ireland" pub-
lished in February 2011, and there is no reason to lbinlc that it will not al$o be ll$ed for Portugal; cf. EM· 
ropean Commissiofl: The Bconomic Adjustment Programme fur Ireland, Dil'ec:torate-General for Ec:o-
nomic and Financial Affairs, Occasional Papers 76, 2011. 
40 To illustrate this in the Greek case, the "second update" of 22 November 2010 contained a commitment 
to "comprehensive reform of the health care system" wbich in the "third update" of 23 February 2011 
came to include detailed targets fur the pricing of generics and fur the methods by which social security 
funds pay physicians. Similarly, where the original agreement bad contained a commitment to "ambi-
tious labour lll8ltet refonns", the sec:ood update specified a new law allowing finn..level collective 
agreements to prevail over sector and occupational agreements, and lbe third update committed the gov-
enunent to "simplify the prooedure fur the crealion of finn..level tnlde unions". In the Irish case, the 
"Memorandum of Undentanding" of 8 December 2010 was more detailed on refurms of the banking 
system but also included precise commitments on labour lll8ltet and pension refonns, on cuts in public-
sector employment and pay, on cuts in social programs aod reductions of the statutory minimum wage. 
41 Quoted from lbe Irish Memorandum of3 December 2010. 
42 In a recent blog post by Max Keiser, a British TV presenter and former Wall Street broker, lbe Greek 
situation is equated wilb an occupation regime imposed by the '7roika" of EU, ECB and IMF authori-
ties, cf.< www.maxkeiser.com>, 28 April2011. 
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commit political suicide or to reconsider the •"bankruptcy-cum-devaluation" 
option. 
It appears doubtful whether the policies imposed by these ·..-escue-cum-
retrencbment" regimes, assuming that they would be faithfully implemented, will 
have a chance of succeeding economically over the medium term. The short-term 
results, at any rate, do not look promising: total debt burdens are still increasing 
(Figure 16), and the interest rates for government bonds still seem to be on the 
rise (Figure 19). At the same time, GIPS economies continue to be in a deep 
recession, with negative or near-zero rates of economic growth in 20 I 0 and 
2011, and with unemployment rates of 15 percent in 2011 in Greece, 14 percent 
in Ireland, 11-12 percent in Portugal and 20 percent in Spain43 (Figure 20). In 
order to meet their minimal political responsibilities, therefore, governments 
must deal with high and rising expenditures on unemployment and welfare bene-
fits and they must cope with falling, rather than rising tax revenues - with the 
implication that despite current denials a severe ••restructuring" of existing debt 
may become unavoidable. 
2. Polltlcallmpllcatlons 
In purely economic terms, therefore, the immediate outcomes of the ••rescue-
cum-retrenchment" program will not differ greatly from those anticipated in the 
•'bankruptcy-cum-devaluation" scenario. In both cases, creditors should not ex-
pect full repayment, and in both cases, international economic viability can only 
be re-achieved by wage decreases in the traded sector to correct the gap in real 
effective exchange rates (Figure 17). But the political implications and distribu-
tional consequences would be quite different. 
••Bankruptcy-cum-devaluation" would be experienced as a sudden shock hitting 
the country as a whole and which, by dramatically increasing the price of im-
ports, would reduce all domestic real incomes at the same time. Beyond that, 
however, all cruelties would have been inflicted by the devaluation itself, and 
national policy and politics could then be about damage control, burden sharing 
and reconstruction. 
The opposite is true under the ·..-escue-cum-retrenchmeot" program that is pres-
ently being enacted. Here, all cruelties must be proposed, defended, adopted and 
implemented over an extended period by the national government. In fact, the 
43 lntematiorlol MOMtory Flllld: World Economic Outlook. April2011. 
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program amounts to a greatly radicalised version of the supply-side reforms 
adopted in Germany during its (much milder) recession before 2005 - which 
destroyed political support for Schroder's Red-Green government. But whereas 
Schroder had the chance of developing and defending self-chosen reforms, the 
governments of Greece, Ireland and Portugal must implement policies likely to 
be seen as dictates from Commission bureaucrats and self-interested foreign 
governments trying to protect their own banks, investors and export industries. 
If these are extremely difficult political conditions, they will be exacerbated by 
the distributional implications. In both scenarios it is clear that the non-traded 
sector will lose out, and that export-oriented industries and services ought to 
gain. Beyond that, however, the higher profitability for investments in export-
oriented production will have been achieved by the devaluation itself, whereas in 
the "rescue-cum-retrenchment" program it must be created by governments 
adopting and implementing policies that must massively and visibly hurt workers 
and welfare recipients while favouring profits and capital owners. As was the 
case in Gennany, the inevitable result will be a rise in social inequality44 and 
social protest. From the political perspective of GIPS governments, therefore, 
''bankruptcy-cum-devaluation" may indeed now appear as the lesser of two evils. 
3. From Rescue Operations to EMU Reform 
But the fate of the economies and governments of GIPS countries is only part of 
a larger process of EMU reforms that are presently under way. In this regard, it is 
indeed unfortunate that worries about the euro were triggered by the Greek sol-
vency crisis - which was initially seen as the self-inflicted result of fiscal profli-
gacy: if Greek governments had not engaged in reckless borrowing,45 it is now 
widely argued, the euro crisis would not have arisen, and if the Commission had 
not been duped by faked records, rigorous enforcement of the Stability Pact 
would have prevented it. So even though the more "virtuous" Member States are 
now unable to refuse help to the "sinners", such conditions should never be al-
lowed to reoccur. And even though this explanation of the problem is only partly 
correct for Greece, and totally wrong for Ireland and Spain, it still dominates 
44 In fact, Gennany was one of the OECD countries wbere social inequality increased the most between 
the mid 1990s and the mid 2000s- wbereas inequality had decreased in Greece, Spain and Ireland (cf. 
OECD: Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Coun!rics. Paris, 2008). 
45 A major factor seems to have been a particularly pronounced inability or unwillingness 10 collect taxes. 
Acoordiag 10 OECD figures, Greek tax revenue declined from 37.8 perc:eot of GDP in 2000 to 32.6 per-
cent in 2008. 
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debate about the crisis in the ''rescuer'' countries, and it frames the approach to 
reforming the EMU regime. 
The "Excessive Deficit Procedure" (EDP), that is to be put into place under Arti-
cle 126 TFEU, amounts to a tougher version of the Stability Pact - with greater 
emphasis on the rapid and continuous reduction of total public-sector debt, on 
the preventive supervision of national budgeting processes, on earlier interven-
tions and sanctions and ''reverse majority" rules for the adoption of more severe 
sanctions by the Counci1.46 But at least the Commission seems also to have real-
ised that budgetary discipline alone, no matter how rigidly enforced, would not 
have prevented the crises in Ireland and Spain - where the steep rise in public-
sector deficits was clearly a consequence, rather than a cause, of the financial 
and economic crisis. 
Hence the Commission now also considers "macroeconomic imbalances" as 
proximate causes of the present crises, and it has proposed to strengthen the 
Treaty commitment to coordinated economic policy (Art. 121 TFEU) by an 
"Excessive Imbalance Procedure".47 Its focus will be on current account balanc-
es, unit labour costs, real effective exchange rates, total (public and private) 
indebtedness and other potentially critical aspects of national economic perfor-
mance. Its central instrument will be a "scoreboard" with a limited (but expanda-
ble) list of performance indicators, complete with upper and lower "alert thresh-
olds". On this basis, "complemented by economic judgment and national 
expertise", the Commission will then identify Member States "deemed at risk of 
imbalance", followed by "country-specific in-depth reviews", "preventive rec-
ommendations" and in the event of "excessive imbalances", Council recommen-
dations of corrective action, with deadlines attached and with compliance to be 
monitored by the Commission. If governments fail to comply, the Commission 
46 f:Mropt!QII Corrrmi:s:sion: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliameot and of the Council on the 
Effective Enforcement of Budgetary SurveiUance in the Euro .Aiea. Nr. 524, 29.09.2010, B111Ssels, 2010. 
At the same lime, however, the proposed Regulation (7843111) seems to soften some of the rigidities of 
the origillal St.tbility Pact by relating its deficit rules to the "medium-term rate of potenlial GDP growth" 
- this obviously places lols of trust in the reliability of eoooomic forecasts or gives lots of room for dis-
cretioouy judpleots by the Commission. 
47 &ropt!Q11 Commi.s.si011: Proposal for a Regulatioo of the European Parliament and of the Council 011 
Eaforcemeot Measures to Correct Excessive Macroeconomic Imbalances in the Euro .Aiea. Nr. S2S, 
29.09.2010, BJUSSels, 2010. 
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may again propose fines that the Council can only oppose through qualified 
majority vote.48 
This ambitious program. which had the support of the Van-Rompuy Committee, 
was approved by the ECOFIN Council on 15 March 2011,49 and is to be adopted 
in June through a series of regulations. It appears remarkable for a number of 
reasons. First, it replaces the rule-based approach of the Maastricht Treaty and 
the original Stability Pact with a highly discretionary regime of supranational 
economic management. Even the new EDP will now refer to projections of ·'po-
tential growth" for its assessment of national budgets. And the EIP must depend 
on disputable hypotheses regarding the causal relevance of specific indicators 
and the critical significance of upper and lower thresholds (quite apart from the 
politically unresolved issue of whether symmetrical controls should be imposed 
on surplus and deficit economies). Moreover, practically all the indicators dis-
cussed refer to phenomena which, unlike public-sector budgets, are not under the 
direct control of national governments. Because government capacity to exercise 
indirect influence over such variables as nominal wages, private saving and 
spending, consumer credit, etc. may either be non-existent or widely varying 
among Member States, compliance with the ·-recommendations" issued by the 
Commission may well be impossible. 
4. The Worst of Three Worlds 
Remarkably, moreover, there is no acknowledgment in any of the supporting 
documents of the role that uniform ECB interest rates played in causing macroe-
conomic imbalances among the heterogeneous member economies of a .. non-
optimal currency area". Nor is there any recognition of the ECB's reluctant but 
constructive role in supporting GIPS banks after 2008, or any discussion on how 
ECB monetary policy could, in the future, avoid monetary impulses that have the 
effect of generating imbalances among EMU economies. 50 In other words, EMU 
Member States cannot expect any help from the European level in managing 
48 In none of the legislative proposals, neither the EDP nor the EIP, is tbenl any suggestion that the adop-
tion of "reverse majority" rules might Rquire Treaty amendments. Bw cf. I>ankl HQ111U111's blog post 
dared 04.10.2010 011 <bap:/Jblogs.telegraph.co.ukl>. 
49 <http://www .consilium.europa.eu/uedocslcms_data'docslpressdatalenlecofin/119888.pdb 
SO The omission seems partieularly swprising since real interest rates are now lower in Germany dlan in 
any GIPS economy (Figure 6), and public discussioos of recent ECB decisions were quite aware of the 
fact that a rise in interest rates, wbich would be justified in reference to Germany, might destroy all 
hopes of recovery in countries such as Spllin. 
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macroeconomic imbalances that are induced by European monetary impulses 
that fail to fit the specific conditions of the national economy. Instead, Member 
States are expected to deal with potential imbalances through the use of their 
remaining policy instruments - but in doing so, they will be constrained by the 
rules of the Excessive Deficit Procedure and they will be controlled by the 
Commission's discretionary interventions under the Excessive Imbalance Proce-
dure. 
These conditions contrast unfavourably with those faced by Member States of 
the former European Monetary System. Though politically committed to pegged 
exchange rates, their governments had retained autonomous control over all 
instruments of macroeconomic policy - which they were able to employ with a 
view to their own economy, its external environment, and their own political 
priorities and constraints. At the same time, however, the governments of these 
Member States remained fully accountable to their own constituents for all fail-
ures of macroeconomic management. 
But the proposed EMU regime also contrasts with conditions faced by member 
governments of a federal nation state with economically heterogeneous regions. 
These are deprived of all instruments of macroeconomic management, and they 
may also suffer from the negative impulses of uniform monetary policies that fail 
to fit local economic conditions. But if a federal government's monetary policy 
may be as much part of the problem as is the case in the EMU, its fiscal policies 
will be very much a part of the solution. Generally, a central government's budg-
et is large; its revenues are based on taxes that have a major impact on economic 
activity and its expenditures include those programs that are most affected by the 
rise and decline in economic activity. Hence the national budget raises most of 
its revenue in high-growth regions, and spends most of it in depressed regions. 
Quite apart from any intergovernmental transfer programs, therefore, national 
taxation and national social-policy expenditures will have powerful inter-
regional equalisation effects. Moreover, and perhaps even more importantly, the 
democratic accountability of central government will be as strong if not stronger 
than that of lower-level governments - as will be its motivation to employ its 
policy instruments with a view to the potential political responses of voters in 
depressed regions. 
Compared to both of these regimes, Member States in a reformed Monetary 
Union will indeed find themselves in the worst of three worlds. Like the provinc-
es or cantons in a federal state, they lose control over the instruments of macroe-
conomic management, and are likely to suffer from uniform national policies that 
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do not fit their regional economy. At the same time, however, the EU budget is 
miniscule in comparison to the budget of federal states, there are no European 
taxes and there is no European social policy to alleviate interregional imbalances. 
Instead, Member States are expected to cope with all economic problems by 
resorting to their own policy resources. In contrast to members of the former 
EMS, however, EMU Member States cannot use these policies autonomously, 
but are subject to the intrusive supervision and potential punishment imposed by 
supranational authorities - which are not democratically accountable and have no 
reason to be politically responsive to the citizens affected by their policies. 
s. Is there a Hidden Agenda of EMU Reforms? 
Assuming that the new regime is installed as planned, its economic success 
would seem to depend on the capacity of the Commission to prevent macroeco-
nomic imbalances by issuing precise policy instructions (named "recommenda-
tions'') to member-state governments. In order to succeed on these terms, moreo-
ver, such instructions would have to fit the economic conditions and trends in 
seventeen heterogeneous member economies. And they would need to work 
under the specific conditions and constraints of industrial organisation, labour-
market institutions, administrative capabilities, and political structures in each of 
these countries. Considering the dismal record of economic forecasts and the 
lack of empirically grounded theory representing the complex linkages among 
heterogeneous economic, social and political structures and processes, this seems 
to imply a staggering research agenda. In this light, the Excessive Imbalance 
Procedure might well be seen as an extreme manifestation of the ''pretense of 
knowledge" of which Friedrich August von Hayek, in his Nobellecture of 1974, 
accused the economic policy makers of the Keynesian era. 51 
Conceivably, however, what the Commission has in mind is something that is 
intellectually much less demanding. It should be remembered that EMU-friendly 
economists have always downplayed the fact that the eurozone was not an "op-
timal currency area". 52 In the words of the ECB's former Chief Economist, it 
was sufficient that member economies should respond to asymmetric shocks 
''with a high degree of flexibility in the markets for goods and services .... This flexi-
bility is needed above all in the labour market, that is, wages must adjust to changing 
market conditions ... The more the price system (in the widest sense) bears the bur-
SI 11011 Hayek, F .A..: The Preteose of Knowledge, Nobel Prize Lecture. 1974. 
52 JOIUIII8. L./Drea, E.. op. cit., 20 I 0. 
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den of adjustment, the less important is the loss of the national exchange rate and 
monetary policy instruments, and the greater the benefit of using a single cur-
rency ... " 
And moreover: 
"Conditions such as the necessary market flexibility can also be created after entry 
into monetary union . ..s3 
If this should also be the underlying theory of the present EMU reforms,54 it 
would begin to make sense that many of the requirements imposed by the 
"Memoranda of Understanding" for Greece and Ireland appear unlikely to reduce 
public-sector deficits over the short or medium term. Instead, they will impose a 
wide range of liberalising and market-making "structural reforms" that will 
weaken union power, privatise public services, liberalise the professions and 
open public health care and education to commercial service providers. 
Obviously, requirements of this type do not have to overcome prohibitive cogni-
tive (empirical and theoretical) difficulties. All they need for guidance are the 
relatively simple rules-of-thumb of supply-side prescriptions that are derived 
from the abstract models of neoclassical micro-economics. From this perspec-
tive, then, the intended practice of the Excessive Imbalance Procedure would 
become another instrument for promoting market-liberalism in the European 
Union. This tendency has characterised European legislation and decisions from 
the European Court of Justice since the early 1980s - and it is in the process of 
transforming the "social market economies" of some EU Member States into 
''liberal market economies"." 
But the reach of "hard" European law is still limited, and the Commission's use 
of "soft" methods in the "Lisbon Process" have not been very successful in pro-
moting "flexibility" in areas where EU Member States continued to defend their 
own competences. The ''Excessive Imbalance Procedure", however, might now 
allow the Commission to pursue its liberalising agenda much more widely and 
effectively. Its ''recommendations" merely need to be justified by reference to a 
!13 lssing, 0.: The Bitth of the Euro, Cambridge. 2009, 48-!10. 
!14 I am not here trying to assess their economic plausibility. But one wonders whether greater market 
Oexibility would have prevented tbe credit financed housing booms in helaod and Spain (01' in the 
USA)? And would union busting and dccelltralised wage negotiations have allowed better respooses to 
the German recession than the economically rnpbisricated bargaining strategy of the powerlW /(]. 
MetoU? 
!1!1 Jabko, N.: Playing the Market. A political ~gy for Uniting Europe. 198!1-2005, llhaca, 2006; 
SchtJrpf. F. W.: Weshalb die EU nicbt zur sozialen Marttwir1scbaft wenlen klum, ZSE 713-4 (2009), 419-
434; SclwJrpf. F. W.: The As)'llllllllll'y of European Integration. Or wby tbe EU Cannot Be a "Social Mar-
ket Economy", in: Socio-Economic Review 8f2 (2010), 211-2!10. 
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list of indicators of "economic imbalance" - but there is no constraint on the 
policy changes that may be required. As long as it is alleged that they may some-
bow have an effect on imbalances, the requirements may specify policy changes 
in a completely undefined range of national competences - including areas such 
as labour relations, education or health care that have been explicitly protected 
against European legislation in successive Treaty versions. And to prevent inter-
governmental bargaining from softening the sanctions against non-complying 
governments, the fines proposed by the Commission would simply be adopted 
by "reverse qualified-majority" voting in the Council. So it all seems to fit neat-
ly. 
VII. Democratic Legitimacy In a Reformed Monetary Union 
Instead of continuing on the slippery slope toward politico-economic conspiracy 
theories, I will now return to issues of democratic legitimacy. From the perspec-
tive of citizens in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, the European and international 
agencies imposing the "rescue-cum-retrenchment" program are not, themselves, 
supported by democratic legitimacy. What matters, therefore, is the relationship 
between citizens and the national governments that are accountable to them. But, 
as I said in the introduction, accountability has an input-oriented and an output-
oriented dimension. 
"Output-oriented legitimacy" reflects popular responses to outcomes that may be 
attributed to the policy output of the government whose performance is at issue. 
Here, a ftrst general observation is that you cannot require voters to be fair and 
that governments may be punished for outcomes over which they bad no control. 
A second general point is that electoral responses reflect relative judgments: 
Three million unemployed in Germany may be a political disaster or a celebrated 
success depending on the figures of recent years. With that in mind, the "rescue-
cum-retrenchment" regime presently imposed on GIPS countries can only be 
considered a disaster of output-oriented legitimacy. Two-digit and still rising 
rates of unemployment, massive real-wage cuts, and rising social inequality will 
surely not generate outcome satisfaction. Under such conditions, GIPS govern-
ments cannot hope to gain political support by appeals to absolute or relative 
measures of economic performance. 
But that does not, by itself, rule out the possibility of input-oriented legitimation. 
Democracy is, after all, about collective self-determination rather than wish 
fulfilment. It is compatible with the need to respect external constraints, and it 
may also support bard choices and painful sacrifices - provided that these can be 
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justified in public discourses as being effective and normatively appropriate in 
dealing with common problems or achieving the collective purposes of the poli-
ty.S6 At the same time, however, input-oriented democratic legitimacy does pre-
suppose the possibility of politically meaningful choices, and it is not at all com-
patible with a situation where choices are pre-empted by external domination. 57 
Margaret Thatcher, for example, was able to gain political support for extremely 
painful retrenchment and structural reforms in Britain after the ''Winter of Dis-
content" of 1979. But in comparison to GIPS governments, Thatcher could ap-
peal to traditional British values to justify sacrifices that she found to be econom-
ically necessary and normatively appropriate.$8 Moreover, all relevant policy 
parameters were under the control of her (unitary) national government. And 
most importantly, her program was entirely self-chosen, hammered out over 
several years in intra-party battles, publicly defended in a successful electoral 
campaign, and supported by a considerable part of public opinion. 
Like Thatcher, the present Greek and Irish governments may, at least for a while, 
benefit from blaming present hardships on their political predecessors. But they 
must still struggle with the perception that the "understandings" they had to sign 
in order to obtain the guarantees of the Financial Stability Fund read less like 
self-chosen programs than like protocols of an unconditional surrender. Thus, in 
order to be able to hang on, they may desperately need to negotiate for politically 
visible European "concessions" and for permission to adopt at least some "non-
liberal" policies to alleviate the worst plight of their constituents. If they should 
fail, and if changes of governments would not seem to make a difference, the 
legitimacy of the democratic regime itself may be in danger - especially in poli-
ties where democratic government is itself a relatively recent achievement. 
To a lesser degree, the same problems may also arise in all EMU Member States 
in consequence of measures required and sanctioned by the Excessive Deficit or 
Imbalance Procedures. In some countries, of course, market-liberal discourses 
may be highly persuasive, and governments would have no difficulty in present-
ing "structural reforms" as autonomous and justifiable national policy choices. 
~ Schmidt, V .A: Does Discourse Matter in the Politics of Welfare State Adjustment?, in: Comparative 
Polilical Studies 3512 (2002), 168-193; Schmidt, V.A.: Democracy in Europe: The EU 8Jid Naliooal 
Polities, Oxford, 2006. 
57 Pettit. P.: Republicanism: A Theo.-y of Freedom and Oovemmeot, Oxford, 19'n. 
58 Schmidt, V.A: Values and Discourse in lhe Politics of Adjustmeot, in: Scbarpf, F.WJSchmidt, V.A. 
(eds.), Welfare and Wart in the Open Economy, Vol 1: From Vulnerability to Competitiveness, Ox-
ford, 2000. 238-242. 
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But where the Commission's requirements would violate politically salient inter-
ests, preferences and values of national constituencies, compliance may again 
undermine democratic legitimacy. This is not meant to suggest that we will soon 
see more banks burning and blood spilt in the streets of Athens, Dublin or Ma-
drid, or of Helsinki and Berlin for that matter. In general, citizens in European 
countries have less to gain and more to lose from open rebellion than has been 
the case in Tunisia, Egypt or Ubya. And the most vulnerable victims of re-
trenchment and liberalisation policies may lack the capabilities and resources for 
effective political action. 
But political resignation, alienation and cynicism, combined with growing hostil-
ity against "Frankfurt" and "Brussels", and a growing perception of zero-sum 
conflict between the donors and the recipients of the ''rescue-cum-retrenchment" 
programs, may create the conditions for anti-European political mobilisation 
from the extremes of the political spectrum. In a worst case scenario, therefore, 
attempts to save the euro through the policies presently enacted may either fail 
on their own terms, or undermine democracy in EU Member States as well as 
endanger European integration itself. 
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Figure 3: Interest Rates on Bonds 
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FiRure 4: Inflation (11) 
Source: OBCD. 
Fi ure 6: Real Interest Rates 
Source: Own Calculation. OECD Data. 
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Source: Ameco Database. 
Note: Based on Unit Labour Costs (To-
tal Economy) Source: Ameco Database. 
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